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Introduction 
Since 1990, United Nations (UN) member-states 
have been increasingly prepared to authorize the 
use offorce under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
Since approving UN Security Council Resolutions 
665 and 678 during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis, the 
Security Council has adopted more than a dozen 
Chapter VII Resolutions that have enabled 
member-states to intervene militarily in regional 
conflicts. These resolutions have provided mem-
ber-states with a legal basis to use force, if 
necessary, against those responsible for aggression 
or a threat to international peace and security. 
Since the Gulf War, the cases in which military 
enforcement measures have been taken include: 
• Operation Restore Hope in Somalia by the 
United Nations Interim Task Force (UNITAF) 
from December 1992 to May 1993 (based on 
Security Council Resolution 794); 
• several air attacks against Iraqi military 
facilities conducted by coalition forces in the 
Iraqi «no-fly zones» (NFZ) in January 1993 
that were justified, according to some 
observers, by a combination of related 
resolutions concerning Iraq, including 678 
and 688; 
• the United Nations Operation in Somalia II 
(UNOSOM II) from May-October 1993, 
notably the pursuit of General Mohamed 
Farah Aideed under Resolution 837; 
• the February 1994 shooting down ofBosnian 
Serb war planes violating the ban on military 
flights (Resolution 816); 
• April 1994 air-strikes against Serb positions in 
the «safe area» around Gorazde in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Resolution 836); 
• the July 1994 military operation to establish 
secure areas for refugees by French-led 
multinational forces (Resolution 929); 
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• August 1994 air-strikes against a Serb anti-tank 
weapon and, in September, against a Serb tank 
in the «weapons-exclusion zone» around 
Sarajevo (Resolution 836); 
• the September 1994 peaceful landing operation 
in Haiti carried out by US-led multinational 
forces (Resolution 940); 
• November 1994 attacks against a Serb-held 
airport in Udbina in Croatia and Serb missile 
sites near Bihac in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Resolutions 836 and 958); 
• and May 1995 air-strikes against a Serb 
ammunition depot near Pale in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Resolution 836); I 
The use of force by states based on these Security 
Council Resolutions is neither an operation of the 
standing UN forces, as envisaged under Article 42 
of the UN Charter, nor is it an operation of the 
basically non-combatant UN peacekeeping forces. 
Instead, recent practice suggests that a significant 
evolution in the role of the Security Council in the 
field of international peace and security has taken 
place. The Security Council, in making a determi-
nation under Article 39 of the Charter, has been 
less restrictive in its interpretation of what consti-
tutes «a threat to international peace and security». 
As this paper argues, such determinations and the 
subsequent authorization of the use of force have 
been made on a case-by-case basis, subject to the 
national interests and political considerations of the 
majority of Security Council members, rather than 
according to objective criteria applicable to all 
conflicts. The paper also examines the dilemmas 
raised by the use of force in peacekeeping opera-
tions and questions, in particular, whether the use 
of air power by NATO in the former Yugoslavia 
was compatible with the overall aim of the UN 
mission. 
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I Haiti; and the fact that a pre-existing Organization 
of American States embargo only required the 
Security Council's sanction in more universal and 
mandatory terms.7 The Security Council President 
announced that the adoption of Resolution 841 was 
«warranted by the unique and exceptional situation 
in Haiti and should not be regarded as constituting 
a preceden!».· The Resolution nevertheless marked 
a change in Security Council practice, as the 
Council had never been directly involved in the 
aftermath of a coup d' etat in a sovereign state, 
previously regarded as a purely domestic matter. 
Varied but Limited Objectives 
The Security Council's authorization of the use of 
force has demonstrated various objectives. The 
first two occasions when the Security Council 
authorized full-scale use of force - in Resolution 83 
of27 June 1950, during the Korean War, and 
Resolution 678 of29 November 1990, concerning 
the Gulf crisis - its objective was clearly indicated 
by the phrase, «to restore international peace and 
security».'1n practice, this meant expelling an 
aggressor from a victim's territory. These cases 
conformed to the function that Chapter VII provi-
sions were originally intended to serve. The 
objective of such use of force, moreover, has been 
proportionate to the gravity of the situations, both 
of which were caused by brazen violations of the 
principle of territorial integrity under Article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter. 
After the Gulf War, the objectives of the use of 
force were initially limited to humanitarian pur-
poses, but have gradually expanded with the 
adoption of new resolutions in response to chang-
ing military needs in the conflicts concerned. These 
objectives can be summarised as follows: 
Fulfilment of Humanitarian Needs. After the Gulf 
crisis, Security Council authorization of the use of 
force by states was introduced primarily for 
humanitarian purposes. The first Security Council 
Resolution of this kind was Resolution 770 of 13 
August 1992 concerning the Bosnian conflict. 1n 
the Yugoslav civil war, the international commu-
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nity found it difficult to identify a single aggressor, 
as it had in Iraq. All the warring ethnic groups 
were more or less responsible for the continuing 
deterioration of the humanitarian situation. The 
victim of the armed conflict was not a sovereign 
state, but civilians within the territory of a single 
state. Accordingly, the objective of the use of force 
in Resolution 770 was narrowly defmed: to «facili-
tate the delivery of humanitarian assistance» in 
order to secure the population's minimum humani-
tarian needs. \0 
Similar objectives were at the root of Resolu-
tion 794 (3 December 1992) regarding Somalia and 
Resolution 929 (22 June 1994) in Rwanda. Resolu-
tion 794 gave authorization «to use all necessary 
means to establish as soon as possible a secure 
environment for humanitarian relief operations in 
SomaliID), while Resolution 929 authorized states 
to conduct a military operation «aimed at contrib-
uting - to the security and protection of displaced 
persons, refugees and civilians at risk in 
RwandID).11 In the case of Haiti, though Resolution 
940 of 31 July 1994 did not refer to humanitarian 
objectives on paper, humanitarian needs were one 
reason for UN intervention. 
Enforcement of Economic Sanctions. The use of 
force has been authorized not only in ground 
operations, but occasionally in sea operations as 
well (by maritime forces) to ensure strict imple-
mentation of UN economic sanctions. In the 
Persian Gulf, Iraq's failure to comply with UN 
sanctions led to the adoption of Resolution 665 on 
25 August 1990, in which the Security Council 
conferred upon the maritime forces of the states 
concerned authorization to use force, if necessary, 
«to halt all inward and outward maritime ship-
ping»." This marked a revival, after a long inter-
val, of a measure taken in the South Rhodesian 
case in April 1966." The phrase used in Resolution 
665, «to use such measures commensurate to the 
specific circumstances as may be necessary» was 
generally interpreted to include the limited use of 
military force." The same wording was adopted 
afterwards in Resolution 787 of 16 November 1992 
with respect to Operation Maritime Monitor in the 
former Yugoslavia, and in Resolution 875 of 16 
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October 1993, regarding the enforcement of a UN 
trade embargo imposed on Haiti. 
Enforcement of a Ban on Military Flights - The 
No-Fly Zone. The concept of a ban on military 
flights, or a no-fly zone, was first introduced in 
Iraq in the area north of the thirty-sixth parallel in 
April 1991. The NFZ was intended to protect the 
Kurdish civilians from Iraqi air attacks, and was 
extended over the area south of the thirty-second 
parallel in August 1992 to protect the Shi'ite 
Muslim minority there. Both NFZs were estab-
lished, though no Security Council Resolution 
referred specifically to them, nor were they justi-
fied as legally consistent with Resolution 688. 
In January 1993, coalition forces conducted air 
attacks against Iraqi missile and radar sites in both 
the northern and southern NFZs. The legal grounds 
for this first use of force by coalition forces after 
the end of the Gulf War remained unclear, though 
«humanitarian intervention» under general interna-
tionallaw, or a combination of all UN resolutions 
concerning Iraq (including Resolution 678) were 
occasionally quoted as legal justification. How-
ever, the lack of a firm legal basis for the attacks 
was not extensively challenged because there was 
wide acknowledgement of the existence of defacto 
agreement among the majority of permanent 
members of the Security Council on the use of 
force. 
Following the above precedent in Iraq, a ban on 
military flights in the air space over the entire 
territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was imposed by 
Resolution 781 of 9 October 1992. The Resolution 
eliminated the ambiguity concerning the legal basis 
for the measure that had existed with the NFZs in 
Iraq. The NFZ in Bosnia aimed to deter Serbian air 
attacks against Bosnian cities. However, frequent 
violations of the NFZ by Serbian aircraft led to the 
adoption of Resolution 816, which authorized 
member-states «to take all necessary measures [ ... ] 
to.ensure compliance with the ban on flights [ ... ] 
proportionate to the specific circumstances and the 
nature of the flights»." 
Support for Peacekeeping Activities. The objec-
tives of the Security Council-authorized use of 
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force have been gradually expanded in Bosnia to 
include helping the UN peacekeeping force to fulfil 
its mandate. This backing for peacekeeping activi-
ties on the ground through the use of air support 
included assistance with the enforcement of a 
newly introduced scheme of safe areas. In order to 
deter Serbian attacks against the Muslim enclaves, 
Resolution 819 (16 April) and 824 (6 May 1993) 
introduced the concept ofsafe areas in Bosnia. 
These Resolutions established safe areas in the 
capital city of Sarajevo, the towns of Tuzla, Zepa, 
Gorazde and Srebrenica in the eastern part of 
Bosnia, and in Bihac in north-western Bosnia. 
Along with the surrounding areas, these towns 
were to remain «free from armed attacks and from 
any other hostile act»." For the purpose of helping 
UNPROFOR fulfil its considerablY expanded 
mandate, including the deterring attacks against the 
safe areas, the Security Council, in Resolution 836 
of 4 June, authorized UN member-states, «acting 
nationally or through regional organizations or 
arrangements» to take «all necessary measures, 
through the use of air power [ ... ] to support the 
Force in the performance of its mandate».17 NATO 
forces have been entrusted with this task. The use 
of NATO air power based on Resolution 836 was 
first confined to the so-called, «close air support» 
for the purpose of defending United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and was later 
expanded to include «air-strikes» for pre-emptive 
or punitive purposes, including the enforcement of 
weapons-exclusion zones. 
Security Council Authorization as 
Political Pressure 
Both in the Gulf Crisis in 1990 and the Korean 
War in 1950, in the face of brazen aggression, the 
use of force had been authorized with plans for its 
imminent implementation. I. However, after the 
Gulf War, authorization of the use of force has 
often been given without plans for imminent 
implementation, but rather to exert political pres-
sure on the parties to a conflict. The adoption of 
Resolution 770 concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina 
was intended to increase pressure on the warring 
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factions to prevent them from blocking humanitar-
ian aid deliveries. Some diplomats were optimistic 
enough to state in the Security Council that the 
adoption of the Resolution itself would persuade 
the Serbian forces not to interfere in the transporta-
tion of humanitarian convoys and that an occasion 
when the use of force became necessary would not 
arise." Also upon adopting Resolution 794, with 
regard to Somalia, the US representative at the 
Security Council stated that the mission was 
essentially a peaceful one and that the United 
States would endorse the use of force only if and 
when it decided it was necessary to accomplish its 
objectives." In such cases, credible resolve, a clear 
objective and overwhelming military power have 
been key factors in building effective political 
pressure to extract concessions without resorting to 
the actual use of force. These conditions seem to 
have been achieved more easily when there was no 
severe clash of national interests between Security 
Council members in the conflict concerned and, in 
particular, when the Security Council let the 
United States lead the operations. 
United Nations Interim Task Force (UNITAF) 
Mission in Somalia in Early-1993. In Somalia, 
Operation Restore Hope conducted by UNITAF 
on the basis of Resolution 794 demonstrated the 
overwhelming power of its 37,000 troops with, in 
the words of then-US President George Bush, a 
limited and specific objective: «to create security 
conditions which will permit the feeding of the 
starving Somali people and allow the transfer of 
this security function to the UN peacekeeping 
force»." US resolve to use force was credible. The 
operation succeeded in facilitating relief activities 
and opening new channels of food-aid delivery to 
local areas without major military confrontations 
with warlords. The improved security for both the 
Somali people and relief workers at the time of the 
transition to UNOSOM II in May 1993 was 
another manifestation of its success. 
October 1994 United Nations Mission in Haiti 
(UNMJH). With regard to Haiti, despite initial US 
reluctance to intervene in 1992, the deteriorating 
humanitarian situation in Haiti and the rapid 
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increase in refugees finally obliged the United 
States to act. President Bill Clinton demanded that 
the military leadership in Haiti step down immedi-
ately, and emphasised his resolve: «when firm 
brutality occurs close to our shores, it affects our 
national interests. And we have a responsibility to 
acl»." The legitimate government of President 
lean-Bertrand Aristide remained in exile, and his 
return to Haiti was a primary and clear objective of 
the operation. When former US President Jimmy 
Carter was sent to Haiti for a final attempt to 
persuade Haitian General Raoul Cedras and other 
military leaders to resign, the US armed forces, 
including at least 12,000 troops, were standing by 
for immediate military action. The landing opera-
tion was nearly launched when the Haitian military 
leadership finally yielded to US conditions, includ-
ing a peaceful landing of the multinational military 
forces led by the United States, and the return of 
President Aristide to Haiti.2J 
National versus UN Command and 
Control 
The command and control over the forces carrying 
out military operations on the basis of Security 
Council-authorized use of force have always been 
a bone of contention between the UN and the 
countries providing military forces. In this regard, 
there has been an interesting evolution in the 
Security Council's attitude. 
Bosnia (Resolution 770) and Somalia (Resolution 
794). The total lack of consultation with the UN 
over the coalition military operation in the Gulf 
crisis evoked wide criticism, leading the UN to 
strengthen its control over such operations. When 
Resolution 770 in the Bosnian conflict was 
adopted, the security of approximately 1,500 
UNPROFOR personnel deployed in Bosnia-
Herzegovina had already become a primary 
concern for their home governments and for the 
Secretary-General." Accordingly, Resolution 770 
provided that the use of force be implemented «in 
coordination with the United Nations». This phrase 
embodied a compromise between the UN and 
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NATO that appeared to constitute the basis for a 
«dual-key» system in subsequent NATO military 
operations." When Resolution 794 concerning 
Somalia was adopted four months later, the UN 
had become still more ambitious to strengthen its 
control over the possible use of force." 
Rwanda (Resolution 929) and Haiti (Resolution 
940). Seemingly affected by its bitter experience 
with the command and control of NATO opera-
tions in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the first half of 
1994, the UN later became more generous and 
realistic. The Security Council has begun to entitle 
a state to its «national command and control», in 
particular when the state that has offered to lead a 
military intervention has been generally recognised 
as having special national interests in the conflict 
concerned. In the cases of Rwanda (Resolution 
929) and Haiti (Resolution 940), though certain 
restrictions on the national command and the 
nominal participation of forces from other coun-
tries were secured, Security Council authorization 
has been tantamount to covering a unilateral 
military intervention - by France and the US, 
respectively - in a UN mantle." 
In Rwanda, Resolution 929 (22 June 1994) 
imposed the modest UN restriction that the opera-
tion be limited to «a period of two months» or until 
«the Secretary General determines at an earlier 
date that the expanded United Nations Mission in 
Rwanda is able to carry out its mandate». In the 
case of Haiti, Resolution 940 of31 July 1994 
enabled the United States to conduct the first 
military operation by organising coalition forces 
under a UN fig leaf in the western hemisphere. The 
Resolution left the Security Council to decide on 
the timing of the operation's termination by 
handing over the functioning of the multinational 
forces to the UN peacekeeping force «when a 
secure and stable environment [had] been estab-
lished». Such a restriction was also necessary to 
alleviate the concerns of many Latin American 
states about the possible use of force by the United 
States that stemmed from a long history of US 
military intervention in the region, including the 
invasions of Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989). 
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The Use of Force by Peacekeepers 
Lightly armed peacekeeping forces deployed in 
volatile and complex environments to conduct 
humanitarian relief operations have been vulner-
able to outside attacks. Security Council authoriza-
tion of the use of force beyond traditional self-
defence has not yielded desirable results, but has 
instead caused damage to the UN's long-standing 
reputation. This can be said about both UNOSOM 
H, after it succeeded the UNIT AF functions in May 
1993, and UNPROFOR in Bosnia after June 1993. 
UNOSOM II (Resolution 837). In Somalia, pro-
longed civil war had caused a tremendous prolif-
eration of weapons. The active pursuit of disarma-
ment by UNOSOM H then triggered a conflict with 
the warlords, especially General Aideed's faction. 
Twenty-four Pakistani peacekeepers were killed in 
an ambush by militias of Aideed's faction on 5 
June 1993 - the biggest single loss ever suffered by 
UN peacekeeping forces. The Security Council 
promptly responded by adopting Resolution 837 on 
6 June, on the basis of which UNOSOM H issued a 
warrant for Aideed' s arrest and initiated the search 
for him. The arrest became a principal task for 
UNOSOM H in the following four months, but the 
concurrent efforts of peacemaking and a military 
campaign did not bring desirable results. Hostile 
actions by the UN against Aideed further aggra-
vated the conflict between them, which brought 
about more casualties on both sides. Aideed' s 
arrest was never accomplished nor had a satisfac-
tory level of disarmament been attained when, on 4 
February 1994, Resolution 897 reduced UNOSOM 
H's mandate to that of a traditional non-combatant 
peacekeeping force. 
UNPROFOR (Resolution 836). Under Resolution 
836 of 4 June 1993, UNPROFOR in Bosnia was 
also authorized «to take the necessary measures, 
including the use offorce, in reply to bombard-
ments against the safe areas»." However, 
UNPROFOR was lightly armed, understaffed and 
reliant on NATO air power, and was in no position 
to enter into military combat; commanders of the 
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force carefully avoided crossing the «Somali 
thresholw>. The bitter lessons learned from 
UNPROFOR have been taken into account in the 
Secretary-General's «Supplement to An Agenda 
for Peace» issued on 3 January 1995, which 
advocated a return to the traditional style of 
peacekeeping operations.2' 
Impartiality and the Use of Force 
Security Council-authorized use of force has 
inevitably led the UN to take sides in the conflicts 
mentioned, inconsistent with their requirement to 
remain impartial. The loss of impartiality has 
disrupted peacekeeping activities, and the use of 
force has endangered their security. Such negative 
features have developed in the Yugoslav conflict in 
particular. 
The UN's initial intervention in the conflict 
under Chapter VII was marked by an arms em-
bargo that treated all warring parties equally. This 
impartial treatment was all the more important 
because the delivery of humanitarian assistance 
required the goodwill and cooperation of all 
parties. However, the adoption of Security Council 
Resolutions 770, 816 and 836, authorizing the use 
of force by UN member-states, (in practice targeted 
against the Bosnian Serb forces), has significantly 
affected the neutrality of UN activities. UN-
member-states have been obliged to pursue two 
incompatible policies simultaneously. On the one 
hand, the UN was to conduct humanitarian relief 
activities and negotiations for a peace settlement -
for which equal treatment of the warring factions 
was required to secure their cooperation. On the 
other hand, the UN was obliged to threaten and 
punish one warring party with the use offorce to 
deter attacks, extract concessions and maintain the 
credibility of the UN. The dilemma became 
particularly acute over the issue of air-strikes. 
Sarajevo - February 1994. In the early stages of 
NATO intervention in Bosnia, both in August 1993 
and February 1994, the threat of air attacks had 
worked effectively as leverage to extract conces-
sions from the Bosnian Serbs in Sarajevo. 
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On 9 August 1993, NATO formally approved 
the possible use of air power against Serbian forces 
for the purpose of close air support to defend 
UNPROFOR if the «strangulatioID> ofSarajevo 
continued. The following year a mortar attack by 
Bosnian Serb forces on 5 February against Markale 
open-air market in downtown Sarajevo left 68 dead 
and 197 wounded, the single worst toll since the 
Bosnian civil war had begun. In response, NATO 
elevated its threat of air attacks to the use of air-
strikes for pre-emptive or punitive purposes, and 
threatened the Serbs with bombardment of their 
artillery positions around Sarajevo. The Bosnian 
Serbs yielded to the NATO ultimatum for the first 
time in August 1993 and subsequently in February 
1994. 
At that time, the varying interests of NATO and 
UN Security Council member-states had not yet 
become a serious obstacle to formulating and 
maintaining a unified policy, and the threat of air 
attacks had much more credibility." 
Gorazde -April 1994. The credibility of NATO's 
ultimatum policy in Sarajevo gradually eroded as 
NATO's use offorce began to antagonise the 
Bosnian Serbs. The possibility ofBosnian Serb 
retaliation againSt the lightly armed peacekeeping 
troops on the ground became a matter of increasing 
concern to the UN and the troops' governments. 
The April 1994 Gorazde incident marked a turning 
point in the effectiveness of the «ultimatum» 
policy. On 10-11 April 1994, NATO forces carried 
out their first air-to-ground attack against Serb 
positions around the safe area of Gorazde, respond-
ing to a UN request for «close air support». 
Though the scale of the air raids was limited, with 
only two US aircraft in use each time, the Serbs 
retaliated by shooting down British Sea Harriers 
and taking scores of UN peacekeepers hostage. 
After heated debate, NATO agreed to apply the 
«Sarajevo model» to Gorazde, and sent. an ultima-
tum to the Bosnian Serbs on 22 April to cease 
shelling Gorazde immediately and withdraw all 
heavy weapons from the weapons-exclusion zone 
around Gorazde. Finally, the NATO ultimatum 
was met, but the military operation in Gorazde, 
including pinprick air attacks, also antagonised the 
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Serbs. At that point, the Serbs officially declared a 
halt to all cooperation with the UN. On II April, 
the Bosnian Serb military command accused the 
UN and NATO of entering the war on the side of 
the Muslims.31 
The Limitations of UN Air Attacks 
The NATO experience in the Bosnian conflict 
indicates that air attacks cannot influence the 
outcome of ground combat. In this regard, the dual-
key system improved the security of peacekeepers, 
but it has paralysed Security Council-authorized 
use of force. 
Friction Regarding the UN-NATO Dual-Key 
System. The Serbs first recognised'the friction 
between the UN and NATO in managing the dual-
key system as a weakness in the April 1994 
Gorazde operation. A NATO request for an 
immediate air strike was blocked by the UN, which 
was reacting to the Serb warning that they would 
be merciless towards UN forces in the event of 
NATO air-strikes. On 26 November 1994, the UN 
mission in Zagreb again rejected a NATO request 
to launch air attacks to destroy surface-to-air 
missile sites that tbreatened NATO planes in nortb-
western Bosnia and Serbian-held territory in 
neighbouring Croatia. The refusal clearly indicated 
how a UN-NATO dual-key system has limited 
military efficacy. 
Udbina and Bihac - November 1994. On 21 
November, NATO warplanes carried out a massive 
air raid against the Udbina air base in Krajina, a 
Serb-controlled region of Croatia, from which 
Bosnian Serb planes had carried out air attacks 
against the safe area around Bihac. The operation 
was the biggest bombing raid in NATO's 45-year 
history, destroying parts of the runway, missile 
sites and other military facilities in the air base. 
Twenty Serb fighter aircraft at the air field, how-
ever, were deliberately left undamaged in compli-
ance with a UN request; NATO's operation was 
being restricted by UN concern for possible Serb 
retaliation against peacekeepers on the ground. As 
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the Serb forces did not stop their attacks on Bihac, 
NATO launched the second attack against tbree 
Bosnian-Serb missile sites near Bihac on 23 
November. Even after these two NATO air attacks 
in Udbina and Bihac, the Bosnian Serb shelling of 
Bihac and its troops' advance towards the city did 
not stop. Such an aggressive attitude by the 
Bosnian Serbs seemed to be based on their convic-
tion that NATO was incapable of stepping furtber 
into the armed conflict against them. On 27 No-
vember, US Secretary of De fen se William Perry 
noted that NATO air-strikes could not influence 
the outcome of ground combat and that there was 
«no prospec!» of the Bosnian government forces 
winning back territory controlled by Bosnian 
Serbs.32 
Sarajevo - May 1995. When the four-month truce 
implemented on 1 January 1995 approached its 
expiration date, fighting once again intensified. 
The Serbs renewed their intimidation of the UN by 
killing two French peacekeepers on 14 April. The 
UN grew even more concerned about the security 
of peacekeepers as contributing states repeatedly 
warned that they would withdraw their forces if 
security conditions did not improve. On 7 May, 
UN officials resisted a call by their military com-
mander in Bosnia for NATO air-strikes to deal 
with a Serb mortar attack from the weapons-
exclusion zone around Sarajevo." 
In this way, the implementation of the Security 
Council-authorized use of force had been carefully 
avoided since the bombardments in Udbina and 
Bihac in November 1994. The UN faced the 
dilemma that NATO inaction would encourage a 
Serb offensive and furtber damage the credibility 
of the use of force, while NATO bombardment 
would sacrifice the security of peacekeepers. 
NATO appeared to opt for a high-risk policy. On 
25-26 May 1995, NATO fighters carried out two 
air raids against a Serb ammunition depot near 
Pale, the Bosnian Serb «capital», demanding that 
the Serbs hand over heavy weapons in the weap-
ons-exclusion zone around Sarajevo. The Serb 
forces immediately stepped up their reiaIiation by 
sheliing five of the six safe areas - including <<the 
most murderous single shelling of the wan> against 
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Tuzla - and by taking more UN peacekeepers 
hostage, some of whom were unarmed military 
observers used as human shields to deter further 
NATO air attacks.34 In such a situation, it became 
practically impossible for the Security Council to 
conduct air-strikes. 
Conclusion 
The UN and the Security Council do not have any 
inherent or self-generating power; the source of 
UN power is decisions taken by member-states in 
accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter. 
Legitimacy, international solidarity and resource 
sufficiency are the basic requirements for the 
effective functioning of the UN in the field of 
international peace and security. Although the 
unprecedented harmony among Security Council 
members during the Gulf crisis created the illusion 
that a «New World Ordem was possible, the UN 
experience since then has been a reminder that the 
effective use offorce depends substantially on the 
political will and harmony of sovereign states. 
These states have varying national interests in 
international conflicts; when those interests di-
verge, decisions regarding the use offorce tend to 
be delayed, and their implementation hindered or 
carried out indecisively and half-heartedly. Such a 
phenomenon has been evident, in particular, when 
both peacemaking and peace enforcement have 
been pursued concurrently. 
Bearing in mind these inherent restrictions, 
however, the role that Security Council-authorized 
use of force has played for international peace and 
security should not be underestimated. It has 
restrained the great powers from resorting to 
unilateral use of force, and has helped to develop, 
however imperfectly, more objective, transparent 
and justifiable international discipline over the use 
of force." The multiplication of UN military 
enforcement measures taken for humanitarian 
causes has also significantly changed the tradi-
tional norm of non-intervention. 
Since the Korean War, virtua1lyall military 
operations based on Security Council-authorized 
use of force have been led by US forces. Some 
16 
argue that Security Council-authorization has only 
served US national interests, been based on double 
standards, and been used to justify arbitrary 
military action by the United States. Nevertheless, 
the UN experience examined in this article indi-
cates that for the foreseeable futore - in which 
greater international control over multinational 
military operations seems unlikely - Security 
Council-authorized use of force cannot work 
effectively without the political leadership of the 
United States and the participation ofits over-
whelming military power. 
Under the newly evolved concept of UN 
Security Council-authorized use of force, it is of 
primary importance to ensure the cooperation of 
the United States and encourage its «enlightened» 
national interests. It is also vital to secure the 
political will and spirit of cooperation of other 
Security Council member-states to take or accept 
hard decisions on security issues. Under such 
conditions, and provided it has sufficient resources, 
the Security Council can be a useful instrument for 
coordinating national interests and providing a 
state-led military operation under a UN banner - a 
token of universality and legitimacy - in order to 
maintain and restore international peace and 
security for UN member-states. 
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